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Struggling Through the Thicket:
Section 301 and the Washington
Supreme Court
Mark L. Adamst
In this article, Professor Adams examines preemption doctrine under
section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, focusing primarily
on the Washington Supreme Court's 1992 decision in Commodore v.
University Mechanical Contractors, Inc. The author traces the history of
section 301 cases, comparing two different theories regarding its correct
application. Under one theory, an employee's state law claim will be
preempted if the underlying right is negotiable or if the employer's
defenses implicate the collective bargaining agreement. Under the
second theory, an employee's state law claim is preempted only when the
right at issue derives from the provisions of a collective bargaining
agreement; on the other hand, an employee's state law claim will not be
preempted if it is based on an independent state law duty. Professor
Adams argues that the Washington Supreme Court, in adopting the
second theory of section 301 preemption, has remained faithful to the
United States Supreme Court's "complete preemption" doctrine, while
providing parties to collective bargaining agreements with a consistent
method of adjudicating state law claims. He notes, however, a trend in
lower federal courts and in state courts toward adoption of the first
model and argues that if allowed to continue, that trend will be
detrimental to the ability of unions to recruit employees and effectively
bargain to protect their rights.
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INTRODUCTION
Preemption under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act' has been described as a "thicket," a "tangled and confusing interplay
between federal and state law" and "one of the most confusing areas of
federal court litigation."2  Despite recent efforts by the United States
Supreme Court to eliminate the confusion,3 lower federal courts and state
courts continue to struggle with this issue. A recent Washington Supreme
Court decision, Commodore v. University Mechanical Contractors, Inc.,'
exemplifies the difficulty courts have experienced in applying the section
301 preemption doctrine developed by the Supreme Court. However, the
bright-line test announced in the decision provides a path through the chaos
and is supported by the Supreme Court's analysis in its line of section 301
cases.
Confusion over the interpretation of section 301 is created by the ten-
sion between federal labor policy and the numerous employment rights cre-
ated by state legislatures and courts. The National Labor Relations Act
(NLRA)5 was the first federal law recognizing the right of workers to form
a union.6 The NLRA was designed to remedy disruption in interstate com-
1. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 141-197 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993) (Taft-Hartley Act).
2. Galvez v. Kuhn, 933 F.2d 773, 774, 776 (9th Cir. 1991) (quoting Stephanie R. Marcus, Note,
The Need for a New Approach to Federal Preemption of Union Members' State Law Claims, 99 YALE
L.J. 209, 209 (1989-90)); see also Singh v. Lunalilo, 779 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (D. Haw. 1991) (com-
menting on problem of reconciling the "dozens, if not hundreds, of federal cases addressing the issue of
the scope of section 301 pre-emption of state law claims."); Geri J. Yonover, Preemption of State Tort
Remedies for Wrongful Discharge in the Aftermath of Lingle v. Norge: Wholly Independent or Inextri-
cably Intertwined?, 34 S.D. L. REv. 63, 65 (1989) (describing federal labor law preemption as a "legal
quagmire").
3. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990); Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S.
386 (1987); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); see also
infra part IV.
4. 839 P.2d 314 (Wash. 1992).
5. 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-169 (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
6. See ROBERT F. KoRiEz, STATUTORY HISTORY OF TiE UNITED STATES: LABOR ORGANIZATION
1-9, 548-55 (1970); PAUL C. WELeR, GovERNING THE WORKPLACE 200-01 (1990); ABA SECTION OF
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merce from labor disputes by granting federal protection to the right to or-
ganize and join labor unions.' While the NLRA is not designed to dictate
substantive aspects of the bargaining process, it does provide a legal frame-
work for the negotiation of the terms of collective bargaining agreements.8
As an amendment to the NLRA, the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA) originally was intended to limit the power of organized labor.9
For example, the LMRA permits states to prohibit compulsory union mem-
bership (so called "closed shops"), and numerous states have enacted "right
to work" legislation under section 14(b) of the LMRA.' °
Section 301 recognizes collective bargaining agreements as enforcea-
ble contracts and grants federal district courts original jurisdiction over suits
for violations of these agreements.'" Section 301 states in part:
Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion representing employees in an industry affecting commerce . . . may be
brought in any district court of the United States having jurisdiction of the
parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or without regard to
the citizenship of the parties.'
2
This section also was found to permit suits brought by individual
employees.'
3
Yet Congress did not specify the scope of the preemption of state law
by federal labor law."' Under the Constitution's supremacy clause, federal
law trumps when it conflicts with state law."' The doctrine of federal law
preemption thus is limited to state laws and regulations that conflict with
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT LAW, THE DEVELOPING LABOR LAW 3-30 (Charles J. Morris ed., 1983) (dis-
cussing the history of the Wagner Act).
7. ROBERT GORMAN, BASIC TEXT ON LABOR LAW 21 (1976).
8. NLRB v. American Nat'l Ins. Co., 343 U.S. 395, 402 (1952); Harry Shulman, Reason, Con-
tract and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1000 (1955); see also Michael H. Gottesman,
Rethinking Labor Law Preemption: State Laws Facilitating Unionization, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 355
(1990).
9. See KORErz, supra note 6, at 548-55 (explaining that the Act was a direct response to the
tremendous growth of union membership and the number of strikes in the 1940's; despite strong opposi-
tion by organized labor, the legislation was enacted over President Truman's veto).
10. 29 U.S.C.A. § 143; see also GORMAN, supra note 7, at 641.
11. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).
12. Id.
13. Smith v. Evening News, 371 U.S. 195, 200-01 (1965).
14. See Judy Hitchcock, Comment, State Actions for Wrongful Discharge: Overcoming Barriers
Posed by Federal Labor Law Preemption, 71 CAL. L. REv. 942, 951 (1983); Archibald Cox & Marshall
J. Seidman, Federalism and Labor Relations, 64 HARV. L. REV. 211, 212 (1950) ("[P]roblems of
supremacy and accommodation are essentially issues of legislative policy.... Yet it is the practice for
Congress to avoid the decision, thus leaving the problems to the Supreme Court. And the Court, para-
doxically, then draws the necessary lines by asking-in form if not in actuality-where Congress drew
them.").
15. This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. IV, cl. 2.
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federal law and policy.' 6 A union employee's suit for enforcement of a
state law employment right raises a section 301 preemption question when
that state right replicates or involves rights granted under the terms of the
collective bargaining agreement. Courts consequently are left to determine
the extent to which Congress intended section 301 to supersede state law by
analyzing the purpose and structure of the statute.1 7
The tension between section 301 and state law began with the erosion
of the traditional employment-at-will rule. 8 During the 1970's, state courts
and legislatures began developing safeguards for individual employment
rights designed to mitigate the effects of the employment-at-will rule.' 9
The first development occurred in the area of unjust dismissal, with some
state courts applying tort and contract theories to hold that certain types of
dismissal offended public policy or breached an implied term of an employ-
ment contract.20 The rule's demise continued rapidly and, by 1988, courts
16. Weber v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 348 U.S. 468, 480-81 (1955). Section 301 is one of three
branches of preemption under federal labor law. The Garmon doctrine, another branch of federal labor
law preemption, establishes the primary jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB).
San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959). In Garmon, the Court held that state
and federal courts must defer to the NLRB when the claim is actually or arguably subject to section 7 or
protected by section 8 of the NLRA, which prohibit unfair labor practices and protect certain concerted
activities. Id. at 244-45; 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 157, 158; see also David L. Gregory, The Labor Preemption
Doctrine: Hamiltonian Renaissance or Last Hurrah?, 27 WM. & MARY L. REV. 507, 523-50 (1986)
(discussing the Garmon doctrine and its exceptions). The Machinists branch preempts any attempt by a
state to regulate conduct that Congress intentionally left unregulated. Machinists v. Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 427 U.S. 132 (1976). For a criticism of Garmon and Machinists preemption of state
labor laws, see Eileen Silverstein, Against Preemption In Labor Law, 24 Cor. L. REv. 1 (1991). This
article addresses only section 301 preemption of state law claims.
17. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724, 733 (1985); Allis-Chalmers Corp.
v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 209 (1985) (quoting Malone v. White Motor Corp., 435 U.S. 497, 504 (1978))
("[C]ourts sustain a local regulation 'unless it conflicts with federal law or would frustrate the federal
scheme, or unless the courts discern from the totality of the circumstances that Congress sought to
occupy the field to the exclusion of the States.' ").
18. The rule that either the employer or employee may terminate an employment relationship
upon giving notice developed in the mid-nineteenth century as a rule of evidence. As originally written,
the rule placed the burden of proof on the employee to show that the hiring was not at will but for a
specified term. H.G. WooD, MASTER AND SERVANT § 134 (1877). However, it quickly developed into
a black letter rule of employment relations: "All may dismiss their employees [sic] at will ... for good
cause, for no cause or even for cause morally wrong, without being thereby guilty of legal wrong."
Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884), overruled on other ground by Hutton v.
Watters, 179 S.W. 134, 138 (Tenn. 1915); see also C.B. LABATr, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF
MASTER AND SERVANT § 159 (2d ed. 1913). For a detailed discussion of the history of the employment-
at-will rule, see David L. Durkin, Comment, Employment At-Will In The Unionized Setting, 34 CATH. U.
L. REv. 979, 982-85 (1985).
19. See HENRY H. PERRIIT, JR., EMPLOYMENT DISMISSAL, LAW AND PRACTICE §§ 2.1-2.38 (2d ed.
1987); Joseph R. Weeks, NLRA Preemption of State Common Law Wrongful Discharge Claims: The
Bhopal Brigade Goes Home, 13 PEPP. L. REV. 607, 607-21 (1986); William L. Mauk, Wrongful Dis-
charge: The Erosion of 100 Years of Employer Privilege, 21 IDAHO L. REV. 201 (1985).
20. See, e.g., Nees v. Hock, 536 P.2d 512, 516 (Or. 1975) (employee fired for serving on a jury);
Mongee v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974) (contract breached when employee was
fired for refusing to date her supervisor); Petermann v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, Local 396, 344
P.2d 25, 27 (Cal. Ct. App. 1959) (employee wrongfully discharged for refusing to perjure himself on
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in thirty-two states had adopted public policy exceptions, eleven had ap-
plied the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and twenty-nine had found
contractual limitations on the employment-at-will rule in employee hand-
book language.2 Today, twenty-two states prohibit termination in retalia-
tion for filing a worker's compensation claim, thirty-four protect whistle-
blowers, and forty-two states regulate the use of lie-detectors in the work-
place.22 Many states also restrict the use of workplace drug tests.2 3 Finally,
most states have statutes that in various ways protect employees in the
event of a corporate takeover.24 Many commentators have applauded this
demise of the at-will rule. 25 But, while these state-mandated employment
rights could act to strengthen unions by providing employment safeguards
in addition to those incorporated in collective bargaining agreements, the
federal labor system often denies union members the benefit of these
rights.26
Because section 301 provides for the enforcement of collective bar-
gaining agreements in federal courts, a section 301 preemption question
arises each time a union worker brings a lawsuit alleging the violation of a
state law employment right that arguably involves the agreement.2 7
Although the Supreme Court has addressed this issue in its line of section
301 preemption cases,28 lower federal courts and state courts have failed to
behalf of his employer). Petermann has been cited as the first case recognizing the wrongful discharge
cause of action. See, e.g., Cornelius J. Peck, Penetrating Doctrinal Camouflage: Understanding the
Development of the Law of Wrongful Discharge, 66 WASH. L. REV. 719, 723 (1991); Marc D. Green-
baum, Toward a Common Law of Employment Discrimination, 58 TEMP. L.Q. 65, 78-80 (1985).
21. Clyde W. Summers, Labor Law as the Century Turns: A Changing of the Guard, 67 NEB. L.
REV. 7, 13-14 (1988).
22. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Legacy of Industrial Pluralism: The Tension Between Indi-
vidual Employment Rights and the New Deal Collective Bargaining System, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 575, 592
(1992), compiled from Individual Employment Rights Manual, 9A Lab. Rel. Rptr. (BNA) 540-92
(1991).
23. Judith M. Janssen, Substance Abuse Testing and the Workplace: A Private Employer's Per-
spective, 12 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 611, 636-39 (1990).
24. Katherine Van Wezel Stone, Employees as Stakeholders Under State Nonshareholder Constit-
uency Statutes, 21 STETSON L. REV. 45, 45-47 (1991).
25. See Clyde W. Summers, Individual Protection Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute,
62 VA. L. REV. 481 (1976); Lawrence E. Blades, Employment At Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 CoLum. L. REV. 1404 (1967); Cornelius J. Peck,
Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law, 40 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1979);
Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public Policy Exception, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1931 (1983). But see Richard A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract At Will, 51 U. CHt.
L. REV. 947 (1984); Richard W. Power, A Defense of the Employment At Will Rule, 27 ST. Louis U. L.J.
881 (1983); Charles A. Brake Jr., Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate At Will: Have the Courts
Forgotten The Employer?, 35 VAND. L. Rev. 201 (1982).
26. Stone, supra note 22, at 576-77.
27. 29 U.S.C:A. § 185(a).
28. United Steelworkers v. Rawson, 495 U.S. 362 (1990); Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef,
Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988); Caterpillar v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386 (1987); International Bhd. of Elec.
Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851 (1987); Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985); Avco
Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, 390 U.S. 557 (1968); Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S.
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develop a uniform rule for the preemption of a union employee's state law
claim. Section I of this article discusses the Washington Supreme Court's
approach to this question and the two models for section 301 preemption
considered in that opinion. Section II examines the section 301 complete
preemption doctrine developed by the United States Supreme Court and
argues that the doctrine focuses the inquiry on the source of the tort duty
rather than on the negotiability of the right or the employer's defenses.
Section III discusses the tension between federal labor policy that favors
arbitration and the Washington Supreme Court's approach. Finally, Section
IV surveys the resolution of claims identical to those brought in Commo-
dore by the lower federal courts and state courts: defamation, race discrimi-
nation, outrage or intentional infliction of emotional distress and tortious
interference with a contractual or business relationship.
II
THE WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT'S BRIGHT LINE TEST
A. Commodore v. University Mechanical Contractors, Inc.29
In Commodore v. University Mechanical Contractors, Inc., the Wash-
ington Supreme Court held that a union employee's state law claims for
defamation, outrage, racial discrimination and tortious interference with a
business relationship were not preempted by section 301. Plaintiff Ernest
Commodore was employed as a welder by University Mechanical Contrac-
tors, Inc. (University) on a job for Boeing.30 In his complaint, Commodore
alleged that during his employment his superintendent, Bernard Spencer,
subjected him to a pattern of harassment that included racist remarks and
threats.3 After quitting his position with University, Commodore began
working for Wright, Schuchart & Harbor (WSH) at a different job site. At
trial, Commodore testified that Spencer repeatedly visited the new site and
continued the harassment, encouraged other employees to do the same, and
told the WSH general foreman, "I fired him .... You should watch him.
You will get rid of him too."32
Commodore filed suit in King County Superior Court against Univer-
sity and Spencer, alleging defamation, outrage, tortious interference with a
95 (1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln
Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
29. 839 P.2d 314 (Wash. 1992).
30. Commodore was a member of the United Association of Journeymen and Apprentices of the
Plumbing and Pipefitting Industry, Local 32. University and Local 32 were parties to a collective bar-
gaining agreement. The co-defendant, Bernard C. Spencer, was employed by University as a superin-
tendent on the Boeing site. Id. at 315.
31. University terminated Commodore during a force reduction in August 1989, but rehired him
on the Boeing job in December of that year. Commodore's employment again was terminated in Janu-
ary 1990, and he was rehired the following April. He testified that the harassment escalated during this
last period, and he ultimately quit on May 18, 1990. Id. at 315-16.
32. WSH management eventually ordered Spencer not to return to the job site. Id. at 316.
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business relationship and racial discrimination. In response to the defend-
ants' motion to dismiss, the trial court found all of the claims preempted
under section 301 and granted summary judgment in favor of the
defendants.
33
On appeal, the Washington Supreme Court reversed the trial court's
decision, holding that the claims were not preempted by section 301, and
remanded the case for resolution of the state law claims. After briefly re-
viewing some of the relevant United States Supreme Court decisions, the
court quoted the current test for section 301 preemption, as stated in Lingle
v. Norge Division of Magic Chef "[An application of state law is pre-
empted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947
only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bargaining
agreement."' 34 Citing the difficulty that courts have experienced in applying
the test enunciated in Lingle,3" the Washington Supreme Court examined
two divergent "models" for using the Lingle test: the White Model and the
Marcus Model.3 6
B. The Two Models for Section 301 Preemption
Professor White's model determines preemption based on whether or
not the employment right at issue is negotiable.37 White argues that the
preemption of state law claims supports labor policies favoring self-govern-
ment and arbitration, which resolves disputes outside the court system:
"[S]uch a policy [does not] necessarily come at the expense of individual
rights. Many of the substantive protections afforded by state law claims are
duplicative of the protections a collective bargaining agreement affords."38
33. The business manager of Local 32 found no basis for grieving Commodore's claims under the
collective bargaining agreement. Id. at 316.
34. Id. at 317-18, quoting Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 486 U.S. 399, 413 (1987) (footnote
omitted). For a complete discussion of Lingle, see infra notes 105-09 and accompanying text.
35. Commodore, 839 P.2d at 318:
Lingle establishes a rule for determining whether state law claims of employees governed by a
CBA are preempted under section 301 but gives little guidance as to what constitutes a state
provided right. As a result, courts are still struggling to ascertain when a claim's resolution
actually will involve interpretation or consideration of the CBA, and section 301 cases are still
far from uniform or consistent, varying widely in their holdings, even after Lingle.
36. Id. at 318-19. See Rebecca Harmer White, Section 301's Preemption of State Law Claims: A
Model for Analysis, 41 ALA. L. REV. 377 (1990); see generally Marcus, Note, supra note 2.
37. White, supra note 36, at 416-34.
38. Id. at 393. However, section 301 preemption is subject to a relatively short statute of limita-
tion (6 months) and the remedies are limited to those available under contract law or the duty of fair
representation. 29 U.S.C.A. § 167; see Lorraine Schmall, Workplace Safety and the Union's Duty After
Lueck and Hechler, 38 U. KAN. L. REV. 561, 564 (1990). See generally Michael J. Friedman, Wrestling
the Giant Squid: The Independence of the Duty of Fair Representation Claim, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1237
(1990). When a claim is preempted by section 301, the employee must rely on arbitration under the
collective bargaining agreement for resolution of the grievance. Because the arbitrator interprets and
applies the terms of the agreement rather than state law, preemption eliminates the state law right.
Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650 (1965); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Naviga-
tion Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960).
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Under Professor White's analysis, a claim based on a negotiable right
always would be preempted. In contrast, a claim involving a non-negotia-
ble or non-waivable right, designed to protect the public at large and that
does not derive from the labor contract, would be preempted only "if its
resolution depend[ed] upon interpretation of the contract, even if that inter-
pretation [was] made necessary by an employer's defense."3 9 She bases
this conclusion on the following language in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck:
[O]ur analysis must focus, then, on whether the Wisconsin tort action for
breach of the duty of good faith as applied here confers nonnegotiable state-
law rights on employers or employees independent of any right established
by the contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim is inextrica-
bly intertwined with consideration of the terms of the labor contract.
40
Professor White interprets this language to mean that when the claim impli-
cates a negotiable right the contract must be examined to determine whether
that right was waived or altered; since this would involve an interpretation
of the contract's terms, the claim is preempted." This analysis would result
in the preemption of virtually all state law claims, unless the legislature
made it clear that the right was not waivable. In the case of a negotiable
right, the employer merely needs to allege in defense that the right was
waived; the claim will be preempted without examining whether the allega-
tion of waiver is true.4 2 Thus, under Professor White's model, a state law
claim is preempted on the mere possibility that it may have been waived,
not because it actually was waived. An employee thus is denied the protec-
tions of the state law, which would have been available absent union repre-
sentation, merely because the union might have waived the state law right.43
Although no federal labor law policy requires this perverse Catch-22 result,
this has been the outcome in several cases."
39. Id. at 416. A negotiable claim may be waived or altered by private agreement and generally
deals with individual rather than public concerns. Id. at 417. Examples of negotiable claims include
common law claims such as slander or defamation, intentional infliction of emotional distress or out-
rage, and claims arising from employee drug testing. Id. at 417-23. In contrast, non-negotiable state law
claims are generally narrowly-tailored statutory remedies designed to protect the public good or provide
a minimum substantive guarantee. id. at 417 n.175; see also Yonover, supra note 2, at 94. An example
would be the claim of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensation claim presented in Lingle.
The Ninth Circuit defined a non-negotiable right in Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543, 546
(9th Cir. 1988): "A right is nonnegotiable if the state law does not permit it to be waived, alienated, or
altered by private agreement."
40. 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1985).
41. White, supra note 36, at 397-98.
42. Id. at 398.
43. See Michael C. Harper, Limiting Section 301 Preemption: Three Cheers For The Trilogy, Only
One For Lingle and Lueck, 66 CHI.-KErr L. REv. 685, 709-10 (1990). White's interpretation of the
Court's preemption test (that is, a claim is preempted when interpretation of the agreement is necessary
to assess the validity of an employer's defense) is also embraced in Todd Brower, Towards A Unified
Accommodation of State Law and Collective Bargaining Agreements: Federalism, Public Rights and
Liberty of Contract, 26 Hous. L. REv. 389, 435-36 (1989).
44. Harper, supra note 43, at 710-12; see also Miller v. AT&T Network Sys., 850 F.2d 543 (9th
Cir. 1988); Douglas v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 572 n.10 (7th Cir. 1989)
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The Supreme Court's decision in Lingle,45 however, casts doubts on
this approach. In Lingle, the Court stated that "[w]hile it may be true that
most state laws that are not preempted by section 301 will grant nonnegoti-
able rights that are shared by all state workers, we note that neither condi-
tion ensures nonpre-emption. 46 Professor White acknowledges that this
phrase is potentially troubling for her idea regarding the preemption of all
negotiable rights, and at least one court has interpreted this statement as a
signal that some negotiable rights may not be preempted. 47 However,
White dismisses the language as inconsistent with Allis-Chalmers and her
analysis of the case, instead interpreting it to express the proposition that
non-negotiable rights generally, but not always, will not be preempted.4 8
Yet the Court further stated, in its discussion of non-negotiable and negotia-
ble rights, that "a law could cover only unionized workers but remain un-
pre-empted if no collective-bargaining agreement interpretation was needed
to resolve claims brought thereunder."4 9 This analysis clearly indicates that
the negotiability of a claim is not dispositive. Instead, the inquiry focuses
on whether an application of the state law right derives from the interpreta-
tion of the collective bargaining agreement or whether the duty implicated
in the complaint is independent of the contract.5 °
In the second model, Ms. Marcus advocates the adoption of a narrow
test for section 301 preemption: a union member's claim should not be pre-
empted if the cause of action does not depend on the existence of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.5 1 Marcus defines an "independent" state law
claim as one that an employee can assert absent an employment contract
and that does not arise from contractual rights, either explicit or implied.
Non-negotiable state law rights are independent by definition because they
cannot be waived or altered by the collective bargaining agreement. Simi-
larly, a negotiable state law right is independent if it does not arise from the
agreement and "only the employer's defense mandates interpreting the
CBA." 2 Under this approach, section 301 would preempt only claims for
breach of contract, breach of an implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and claims based directly on a violation of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.5 3 The same rights then would be available to non-union, as
(upholding preemption if right is "arguably sanctioned" by labor agreement); discussion of Allis-Chal-
mers, infra note 87 and accompanying text.
45. 486 U.S. 399 (1987).
46. Id. at 407 n.7.
47. White, supra note 36, at 412 n.158; see also Miller, 850 F.2d at 547-48.
48. White, supra note 36, at 412 n.158.
49. 486 U.S. at 407 n.7.
50. Id. at 413.
51. Marcus, Note, supra note 2, at 225.
52. Id. at 210 n.13.
53. Id. at 225 (for the third claim, she provides the example of an intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress claim supported solely by an allegation that the defendant breached the collective bargain-
ing agreement).
SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
well as union, employees when the cause of action does not depend on the
existence of an employment contract.5 4 When the employer's defense
raises a federal question, the state court can assess the validity of the de-
fense under its concurrent jurisdiction."
C. The Washington Supreme Court's Application
The Washington Supreme Court rejected White's model because it
broadened the scope of section 301 preemption beyond the intent of Lin-
gle.56 In contrast, the court found Marcus's model to be true to the lan-
guage of Lingle, while also addressing section 301 policy concerns. 7 In
addition, the model "provides the desired certainty to parties to a [collective
bargaining agreement] because it draws a bright line between those claims
which are preempted and those which are not." 8
The court applied Marcus's model to Commodore's claims, holding
that the claims were not preempted under section 301 because they were
based on independent state law rights that could have been asserted absent a
contract. The claims were based not on a collective bargaining agreement,
but rather on a source of legal duty independent of any contract.5 9 Commo-
dore's claim for racial discrimination was "based on the independent state
law right" codifying anti-discrimination principles "and could have been
brought in the absence of a CBA."'  Similarly, the cause of action for defa-
mation existed "independently of any CBA in the common law of Washing-
ton," especially when the alleged defamation was unrelated to an
investigation, termination or grievance proceeding.6'
In response to the defendants' argument that the outrageousness of
their conduct depended on the scope of the conduct permissible under the
terms of the contract, the court found that resolution of the elements of
outrage did not require interpretation of any terms. Furthermore, the tort of
outrage arose from a "source of legal duty-Washington tort law-in-
dependent of [the] contract." 62 Finally, the claim of tortious interference
with a business relationship was not preempted; the elements of the claim
did not require the existence of an enforceable contract or the breach of one,
54. Id. at 226.
55. Id. at 227 (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962)).
56. Commodore, 839 P.2d at 319.
57. Id. at 319 (noting the policies of the uniform application of federal law and the maintenance of
certainty in the negotiation, administration and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements). In
Lucas Flour, the Court discussed the need for a uniform body of federal law regarding the interpretation
and enforcement of collective bargaining agreements in order to promote industrial peace and also pro-
vide certainty to the parties over the negotiation and administration of labor contracts. Local 174, Team-
sters v. Lucas Flour Co., 369 U.S. 95, 104 (1962); see also infra notes 71-72 and accompanying text.
58. Commodore, 839 P.2d at 319.
59. Id. at 320-23.
60. Id. at 320.
61. Id. at 320-21.
62. Id. at 322.
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so Commodore could have asserted his claim regardless of the existence of
a labor agreement. Moreover, the claim alleged tortious interference with
the relationship between Commodore and WSH, and the defendants did not
allege that WSH was a party to the collective bargaining agreement.63
Although the defendants did not file an answer, the court noted that if any
defenses raised federal questions, the trial court could evaluate the defenses
under its concurrent jurisdiction to interpret collective bargaining agree-
ments.' Fear that employers would assert groundless defenses in order to
implicate the contract and secure preemption motivated the court to adopt
this approach.65
Critical of the majority's reasoning, two judges concurred only in the
result. They noted that the White model never had been cited by a majority,
while Marcus's had been cited only for the proposition that section 301
preemption is a confused area of federal litigation and for the idea that
employers might assert invalid defenses to avoid state law. 66 As the con-
curring opinion stated, "[s]urely there is better authority for a reasoned
opinion."67
IlI
THE SUPREME COURT'S SECTION 301 DOCTRINE
Although the Washington Supreme Court's decision in Commodore
admittedly rests on shaky legal authority, a careful examination of the
United States Supreme Court's decisions supports this application of the
section 301 preemption test. Rather than examining the negotiability of the
state law right or the merits of the defendant's section 301 defense, raised
either as a jurisdictional basis for removal or as a substantive defense to a
state law claim, the focus of the inquiry should be on whether the duty
allegedly violated arises from the terms of a labor contract or from some
other independent source such as state law.68
63. Id. at 322-23.
64. Id. at 323 (citing Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962)).
65. Id. An employer can defend against a variety of state law torts by asserting a legal right to act
in the manner challenged. For example, an employer enjoys a qualified privilege against defamation
when it serves a legitimate business interest.
66. Commodore, 837 P.2d at 323-24 (Brachtenbach, J., concurring) (citing Galvez v. Kuhn, 933
F.2d 733, 776, 780 (8th Cir. 1991); Singh v. Trustees, 779 F. Supp. 1265, 1268 (D. Haw. 1991); Smith
v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 752 F. Supp. 273, 277 (S.D. Ind. 1990)).
67. Id. at 324.
68. See McCormick v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 545 (4th Cir. 1991) (Phillips, J.,
dissenting), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 912 (1992); see also Harper, supra note 43, at 718 ("The appropriate
rule for section 301 preemption thus focuses on whether the state law claim is dependent on the exist-
ence of a collective agreement, rather than on whether the state law claim requires the interpretation of
the agreement.").
SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
A. The Need for Uniform Federal Law
Initially, the United States Supreme Court questioned whether section
301 was constitutional because it lacked any substantive law constituting
the basis of a federal question for federal jurisdiction purposes. 69 In West-
inghouse, the Court did not resolve whether section 301 was merely juris-
dictional in terms of permitting removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441 for suits
alleging violation of a collective bargaining agreement, or whether it also
contained a substantive component.7" However, in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills,7" the Court held that section 301 authorized federal courts
to develop a uniform body of substantive law for the interpretation and
enforcement of collective bargaining agreements.72 The Court reasoned
that a contrary result would undermine the purpose of the LMRA, which
was to provide for the judicial enforcement of contracts between employers
and unions in order to resolve grievances through arbitration.73
In the next important case examining section 301 preemption, Charles
Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney,7 4 the Supreme Court held that state courts have
concurrent jurisdiction over section 301 claims. The purpose of section 301
was to promote industrial peace through the collective bargaining process
and to encourage labor and management to honor collective bargaining
agreements by including federal courts among the judicial fora available to
enforce those agreements. The Court reasoned that denying state courts
jurisdiction to hear section 301 suits would obviate this purpose. State
courts were required, however, to apply federal common law governing the
interpretation and enforcement of labor contracts, as well as to participate in
the development of this law.75
Noting the need for a uniform body of federal law to promote indus-
trial peace, the Court held in Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flour Co.7 6 that
the supremacy clause required the body of federal law developed by state
and federal courts to displace any state law regarding the interpretation and
enforcement of labor contracts.77 Otherwise, it reasoned, varying interpre-
tations of the terms of a collective bargaining agreement under state and
69. Association of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 348 U.S. 437,
447-51 (1955).
70. Id.
71. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
72. Id. at 456-57.
73. Id. at 456.
74. 368 U.S. 502, 507, 513-14 (1962).
75. Id. at 508-09.
76. 369 U.S. 95 (1962).
77. Id. at 102-04; see also U.S. COs-T. art. VI, cl. 2:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof, and all Treaties made, shall be the Supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every
State shall be bound thereby; any Thing in the Constitution or Law of any State to the Con-
trary notwithstanding.
See also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN Co NsrrunoNAL LAW 479-511 (2d ed. 1988).
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federal law would disrupt the negotiation and administration of labor
contracts:
The possibility that individual contract terms might have different meanings
under state and federal law would inevitably exert a disruptive influence
upon both the negotiation and administration of collective agreements....
[T]he process of negotiating an agreement would be made immeasurably
more difficult by the necessity of trying to formulate contract provisions in
such a way as to contain the same meaning under two or more systems of
law which might someday be invoked in enforcing the contract. Once the
collective bargain was made, the possibility of conflicting substantive inter-
pretation under competing legal systems would tend to stimulate and pro-
long disputes as to its interpretation.78
Despite the straightforward logic supporting the need for a uniform federal
law regarding labor contracts, confusion arose when the Court considered
the scope of preemption under section 301.
B. The Complete Preemption Doctrine
The Supreme Court next determined, in Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No.
735,79 that section 301 preemption could provide the basis for removal ju-
risdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1441. In that case, the Court found that section
301 preemption was so expansive that claims based exclusively on state
contract law were not only preempted, but also became federal question
claims.8" In response to an employer's claim for breach of a no-strike
clause, the union argued in defense that section 301 preempted the state
breach of contract action. The Supreme Court held that any state law cause
of action for violation of a collective bargaining agreement was entirely
displaced by section 301.8" Under this doctrine of "complete preemption,"
such claims arose under federal law and thus could be removed to federal
courts under section 1441, despite the fact that removal jurisdiction typi-
cally is denied when a federal issue, such as section 301 preemption, is
raised in defense.82
78. Lucas Flour, 369 U.S. at 103-04.
79. 390 U.S. 557 (1968).
80. Id. at 560-62.
81. Id. (holding that a state law claim of breach of the collective bargaining agreement is wholly a
matter of federal law under section 301).
82. Id. at 560; see also 28 U.S.C.A. § 1441(b) (West 1973 & Supp. 1993) (permitting statutory
removal of federal question cases). Note that section 1441(a) permits removal only when a federal court
has original jurisdiction and section 1331 grants original federal jurisdiction over claims that raise a
federal question. The scope of federal jurisdiction is determined with reference to the well-pleaded
complaint rule, which states that when a complaint fails on its face to present a federal issue, a federal
defense by itself is insufficient grounds for removal or original federal jurisdiction. See Stone, supra
note 22, at 597 n.83. As stated by the Supreme Court, "[t]he rule makes the plaintiff the master of the
claim; he or she may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state law." Caterpillar, Inc. v.
Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
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In Franchise Tax Bd. v. Construction Laborers Vacation Trust," the
Court further defined "complete preemption" when it refused to find re-
moval jurisdiction in a state attachment action where preemption was raised
as a defense. The Court distinguished that case from section 301 preemp-
tion in its discussion of the Avco decision, stating that although a preemp-
tion defense did not generally create federal jurisdiction, "the pre-emptive
force of § 301 [was] so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of
action 'for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor organiza-
tion."'84 Under the "complete preemption" doctrine, an independent corol-
lary to the well-pleaded complaint rule, some claims of preemption do give
rise to removal jurisdiction when, as with section 301, the federal interest is
so strong as to completely supplant the state claim.85 This doctrine trans-
forms a claim involving interpretation or enforcement of a collective bar-
gaining agreement into a section 301 claim from its inception.86
While Avco made it clear that state law claims alleging the breach of a
collective bargaining agreement were completely preempted under section
301, the issue remained whether section 301 completely preempted any
state law claims beyond those that expressly alleged such a breach. This
issue was presented in Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck" in which an em-
ployee sued his employer under a Wisconsin law defining as a tort the
wrongful and bad-faith handling of an insurance claim, after the employer
harassed its employee about the claim and directed the insurer to discon-
tinue payments. The employee had qualified for disability benefits under a
collective bargaining agreement after suffering a nonoccupational back in-
jury. The Court held the tort claim was preempted under section 301 be-
cause resolution of the state-law claim was "substantially dependent upon
analysis of the terms of an agreement made between the parties in a labor
contract .. .""
83. 463 U.S. 1 (1983).
84. Id. at 23 (quoting 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a)).
85. Id. at 22; see also Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 63-64 (1987) (noting that
section 301 has "extraordinary pre-emptive power."). As the Court in Metropolitan stated:
One corollary of the well-pleaded complaint rule... is that Congress may so completely pre-
empt a particular area that any civil complaint raising this select group of claims is necessarily
federal in character. For 20 years, this Court has singled out claims preempted by § 301 of the
LMRA for such treatment.
Id. at 65.
86. 463 U.S. at 23-24 (citing Avco Corp. v. Aero Lodge No. 735, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists, 376
F.2d 337, 339-40 (6th Cir. 1967), affid 390 U.S. 557 (1968), for the proposition that "if a federal cause
of action completely preempts a state cause of action, any complaint that comes within the scope of the
federal cause of action necessarily 'arises under' federal law"); see also Stanley Blumenfeld, Jr., Com-
ment, Artful Pleading And Removal Jurisdiction: Ferreting Out The True Nature Of A Claim, 35 UCLA
L. REv. 315, 349-55 (1987-88) (criticizing Franchise Tax Board decision because the analysis requires a
finding of preemption as a precondition of federal jurisdiction, thus necessitating a decision on the
merits prior to a finding of jurisdiction).
87. 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
88. Id. at 220 (citation omitted).
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Reasoning that the contract might contain implied terms that defined
the employer's duty to pay insurance benefits, the Supreme Court found the
claim was preempted because the "duties imposed and rights established
through the state tort thus derive[d] from the rights and obligations estab-
lished by the contract." 89 The state law right "not only derive[d] from the
contract, but [was] defined by the contractual obligation of good faith,
[and] any attempt to assess liability here inevitably [would] involve con-
tract interpretation."9 Limiting complete preemption to formally alleged
breach of contract claims would "elevate form over substance and allow
parties to evade the requirements of § 301 by relabeling their contract
claims as claims for tortious breach of contract."9'
However, not every suit "tangentially" involving a term of a labor con-
tract is preempted by section 301.92 Instead, the focus of the analysis must
be on whether the state claim confers independent, non-negotiable state law
rights or whether evaluation of the tort claim is "inextricably intertwined
with consideration of the terms of the labor contract. '9 3 In Allis-Chalmers,
even though the complaint was pled as a state law tort claim, evaluation of
that claim was "inextricably intertwined" with the agreement because the
employer's duty originated in the agreement, which provided the benefits
and prescribed the claims process.94
In a straightforward application of the Allis-Chalmers analysis, the
Court held in International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler95 that a state
law claim of negligence against a union for failure to provide a safe work-
place was preempted by section 301. Section 301 governs claims founded
directly on rights created by a collective bargaining agreement and claims
"substantially dependent on analysis of a collective-bargaining agree-
ment." 96 The duty relied on by the plaintiff did not exist independently of
the labor contract, but rather allegedly was created by the collective bar-
gaining agreement.97 Resolution of the tort claim required the court to "as-
certain, first, whether the collective-bargaining agreement in fact placed an
89. Id. at 217.
90. Id. at 218.
91. Id. at 211.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 213.
94. Id. at 217-18. Allis-Chalmers has been interpreted as finding preempted any claim based on a
state law that may be waived in a collective bargaining agreement. See supra notes 37-43 and accompa-
nying text; Anthony Herman, Wrongful Discharge Actions After Lueck and Metropolitan Life Insur-
ance: The Erosion of Individual Rights and Collective Strength?, 9 INDUS. REL. L.J. 596, 634 (1987).
Yet Allis-Chalmers merely states that state law rights that can be waived must be preempted if the rights
do not exist "independent of any right established by contract .... " 471 U.S. at 213. Hence, the
negotiability of the state law right is not the controlling factor in section 301 analysis. Instead, the
inquiry examines whether the right is independent of the contract, meaning that the tort duty is created
by state law rather than the labor contract.
95. 481 U.S. 851, 856-59 (1987).
96. Id. at 859 n.3 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220).
97. Hechler, 481 U.S. at 859-61.
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implied duty of care on the Union. . . , and second, the nature and scope of
that duty .... ,9' Because the complaint expressly alleged that the duty to
provide a safe workplace derived from the agreement, the claim was pre-
empted: it arose exclusively from contracts and agreements between the
union and the employer.99 The Court's analysis in Hechler makes it clear
that resolution of the section 301 preemption issue depends on the source of
the allegedly violated duty.
Confusion over the scope of the "complete preemption" doctrine arose
in the Court's next decision, Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams,"° which held
that a claim for breach of an individual employment contract was not com-
pletely preempted under section 301. In that case, a group of employees
claimed that their employer had breached individual contracts signed prior
to their joining the union. The employer sought removal by arguing in de-
fense that the collective bargaining agreement included a waiver of any pre-
existing individual contract rights. Finding that the defense raised a federal
question, the district court granted removal jurisdiction and dismissed the
claim as a section 301 action for failure to exhaust the contractual
remedies.t10
Affirming the Ninth Circuit's reversal, the Supreme Court held that the
claim did not arise under section 301 because the complaint did not rely
upon the bargaining contract and the asserted rights did not require interpre-
tation of that agreement. As pleaded, the claims were not "substantially
dependent" upon interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement;
rather, the allegedly violated rights arose under the individual contracts. 102
Therefore, the federal courts did not have removal jurisdiction. 10 3 The
Court noted that "a plaintiff covered by a collective-bargaining agreement
is permitted to assert legal rights independent of that agreement, including
state-law contract rights, so long as the contract relied upon is not a collec-
tive-bargaining agreement."" ° In addition, the Court explicitly rejected the
employer's attempt to create a basis for complete preemption by raising the
collective bargaining agreement as a defense: "[A] defendant cannot,
merely by injecting a federal question into an action that asserts what is
plainly a state-law claim, transform the action into one arising under federal
law, thereby selecting the forum in which the claim shall be litigated."' '
Because of the policies underlying the well-pleaded complaint rule, re-
moval should be denied whenever federal questions are presented only in
98. Id. at 862.
99. Id. at 859.
100. 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987).
101. Id. at 390.
102. Id. at 394 (quoting Hechler, 481 U.S. at 859 n.3).
103. Williams, 482 U.S. at 391.
104. Id. at 396 (emphasis in original).
105. Id. at 399 (emphasis in original).
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defense. '0 6 The federal defense based on the collective bargaining agree-
ment could be considered by the state court upon remand, and for that lim-
ited purpose the state court might interpret the agreement by applying
federal law.'0 7
Confusion over the scope of complete preemption arose because the
Court's decisions were ambiguous where the employer raised a defense of
an implied term or waiver in the collective bargaining agreement. In Wil-
liams the employer's defense was rejected, while in Allis-Chalmers the
claim was preempted based on the argument that the agreement contained
implied terms that limited the employer's obligation to pay medical insur-
ance. While these two cases are not easily reconciled, some courts at-
tempted to do so under the theory of partial preemption, reasoning that not
all cases preempted under section 301 were also subject to removal jurisdic-
tion.10 8 These courts interpreted Williams as addressing only the issue of
removal jurisdiction, "not the substantive merits of a pre-emption de-
fense."' 9 However, most courts and commentators have rejected this the-
ory, instead interpreting Williams as restricting substantive preemption
under section 301, as well as removal jurisdiction under section 1441, when
an employer raises a defense based on the collective bargaining agree-
ment." Therefore, a state court action cannot be removed solely on the
106. Id. at 398-99 (noting the following policies: the plaintiff is the master of the complaint, a
federal question must appear on the face of the complaint and the plaintiff may choose a state forum for
the cause of action by eschewing claims based on federal law).
107. id. at 398.
108. See Richard E. Schwartz & James E. Parrot, A New Look at Federal Labor Law Preemption:
Unionized Employees' Claims in State Court, 7 ST. LouIs U. PUB. L. REv. 297, 305 (1988) (noting the
difficulty in reconciling the two cases); Adkins v. General Motors Corp., 946 F.2d 1201, 1207-08 (6th
Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1936 (1992); Schacht v. Caterpillar, Inc., 571 N.E.2d 1215, 1218 (I11.
App. Ct.), appeal denied, 580 N.E.2d 134 (II1. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1306 (1992).
109. Schacht, 571 N.E.2d at 1217. The "artful pleading" doctrine permits removal and denies a
plaintiff the choice of a state forum when the claim asserted is essentially federal. See 14A CHARLES A.
WRImHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3722, 266-70 (2d ed. 1985); Travelers Indem.
Co. v. Sarkisian, 794 F.2d 754, 758 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 277 (1986) ("[A] plaintiff may not
defeat removal by clothing a federal claim in state garb .... ); Treadaway v. Academy of Motion
Picture Arts & Sciences, 783 F.2d 1418, 1421 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) ("The 'artful pleading' doctrine has
been developed in the context of removal jurisdiction to prevent plaintiffs from foreclosing defendants'
rightful access to federal fora by framing their complaints in an artificial and deceptive manner."); see
also Blumenfeld, Comment, supra note 86, at 321 (arguing for abandonment of the "artful pleading"
doctrine).
110. See Stone, supra note 22, at 602 n.107 (citing McCormick v. AT&T Technologies, 934 F.2d
531, 534 (4th Cir. 1991) (standard for section 301 preemption and removal are the same); Berda v. CBS,
Inc., 881 F.2d 20, 23-24, 26 (3d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 879 (1990); Schwartz & Parrot,
supra note 108, at 305 ("[Williams] made it clear that defensive federalization of a claim is no longer
permitted.")). But see White, supra note 36, at 408-09 (distinguishing "complete" preemption that will
support removal jurisdiction from "ordinary" preemption that will not permit removal, but will displace
state law).
"Ordinary" preemption can be distinguished from "complete" preemption. While voiding other-
wise applicable state law, the former will not support removal unless the complaint raises a federal
question. In contrast, "complete" preemption recharacterizes a facially valid state claim as a federal
question claim that is removable. Eric J. Moss, Note, The Breadth of Complete Preemption: Limiting
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basis of a federal question defense raised by an employer. The "complete
pre-emption corollary to the well-pleaded complaint rule" establishes that,
if a collective bargaining clause forms the basis for the complaint, the claim
is "purely a creature of federal law, notwithstanding the fact that state law
would provide a cause of action in the absence of § 301," and thus can be
removed and ultimately preempted.' But a claim that relies solely on a
duty created by a source independent of the collective bargaining agree-
ment, such as state tort law or an individual contract, will not be preempted,
even when the employer raises a section 301 federal question in its defense.
C. The "Independent" Tort Duty
In an effort to eliminate the confusion in the lower courts over the
scope of section 301 preemption, the Supreme Court again considered the
complete preemption issue in Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef. 2 In
that case, after notifying her employer that she had been injured on the job
and requesting worker's compensation, the plaintiff was discharged for sub-
mitting a false worker's compensation claim and filed a state law tort claim
of retaliatory discharge. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's
finding of preemption," 3 holding that the state tort of retaliatory discharge
was "inextricably intertwined" with the collective bargaining agreement be-
cause "it implicate[d] the same analysis of the facts as would an inquiry
under the just cause provisions of the agreement.""' 4
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the issue of whether the
discharge was retaliatory required only factual inquiries regarding the em-
ployer's motivation, and did not depend on interpretation of the collective
bargaining agreement. The state action was considered "independent" for
purposes of section 301 preemption, despite the employer's assertion that
the non-retaliatory reason for the discharge was covered by the contract's
"good cause" provision." 5 The Court also rejected the Seventh Circuit's
reliance on the parallelism between the facts considered in the state claim
and the grievance procedure. That similarity did not negate the "indepen-
the Doctrine to Its Roots, 76 VA. L. REv. 1601, 1611-14 (1990). Section 301 presents a complete
preemption situation. "Ordinary" preemption is the typical problem presented when state and federal
law conflict. This is distinct from "partial" preemption, in which a minority view finds that removal
jurisdiction does not exist even though the substantive claim is preempted.
I 11. Williams, 482 U.S. at 393-94 (quoting Franchise Tax Board v. Construction Laborers Vacation
Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23 (1983)). For a detailed discussion of the complete preemption doctrine, see gener-
ally Note, supra note 103.
112. 486 U.S. 399 (1988).
113. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, 823 F.2d 1031 (7th Cir. 1987), rev'd 486 U.S. 399
(1988).
114. Id. at 1046.
115. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10. But see Susan Fitzgibbon Kinyon & Joseph Rohlik, Deflouring
Lucas Through Labored Characterizations: Tort Actions of Unionized Employees, 30 ST. Louis U. L.J.
1, 5 (1986) (arguing that state tort actions are conceptually disputes arising from employment relation-
ships covered by collective bargaining agreements and arbitration clauses).
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dence" of the state claim; "as long as the state-law claim can be resolved
without interpreting the agreement itself, the claim is 'independent' of the
agreement for § 301 pre-emption purposes."' 16 Any unresolved issues re-
quiring interpretation of the contract could be determined by the state court
applying federal law, without upsetting the underlying state law claim. As
the Court concluded, "an application of state law is pre-empted by § 301
... only if such application requires the interpretation of a collective-bar-
gaining agreement.""' 7
In the difficult case of United Steelworkers v. Rawson,' 18 the Supreme
Court once again focused its inquiry on whether the duty allegedly violated
derived from the collective bargaining agreement or from an independent
source of state tort law. In Rawson, survivors of miners killed in a mine fire
claimed that the union negligently undertook safety inspections of the mine.
The Supreme Court reversed the Idaho Supreme Court's decision that a
state wrongful death claim against the union was not preempted by section
301.' t' The Idaho Supreme Court had held that the terms of the collective
bargaining agreement required no interpretation; "rather the provisions de-
termine only the nature and scope of the Union's duty."' 20 Therefore, ac-
cording to the state court, the terms of the agreement were not "inextricably
intertwined" with the state law claim. By undertaking safety inspections in
the mine, the union had assumed an extra-contractual duty based on general
tort principles, rather than a duty defined by the terms of the agreement.12'
A majority of the Supreme Court disagreed and held that the claim was
preempted. It concluded that the union's conduct could be measured only in
terms of the collective bargaining agreement and thus was not independent
of the contract.' 22 The majority concluded that the safety inspections were
undertaken only pursuant to the authority granted by the agreement: "the
duty on which respondents relied as the basis of their tort suit was one
allegedly assumed by the Union in the collective-bargaining agreement."' 23
The dissent argued that the majority should defer to the Idaho Supreme
Court's finding that the state law elements could be proven without relying
on the contract, rather than reinterpret Idaho tort law. As interpreted by the
116. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 410 (footnote omitted).
117. Id. at 413.
118. 495 U.S. 362 (1990).
119. Id. at 368. The plaintiffs also claimed fraud based on alleged representations that the union
had special expertise in safety. The Idaho court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the fraud claim,
finding that the record failed to show any evidence that the union made any misrepresentations of fact or
intended to defraud the miners, or that the miners relied on the alleged misrepresentations.
120. Rawson v. United Steelworkers, 726 P.2d 742, 751-52 (Idaho 1986).
121. Id. at 753.
122. Rawson, 495 U.S. at 371.
123. Id. at 370.
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Idaho Supreme Court, the state law imposed a duty of reasonable care on
the union, which applied once the union undertook the safety inspections. 1
24
D. The Applicable Test for Section 301 Preemption
The Supreme Court's approach to section 301 "complete preemption"
focuses on the language of section 301, which authorizes suits in federal
court only "for violation of [labor] contracts."'' 25 Under this approach, sec-
tion 301 preempts state law claims that expressly allege the violation of a
collective bargaining agreement. 126  Beyond an express claim for violation
of the contract, section 301 also preempts claims that are determined to be
claims for violation of the labor contract in substance though not in form;
parties are thereby prevented from "evad[ing] the requirements of § 301 by
relabeling their contract claims as claims for tortious breach of contract."' 27
As the Court explained in Rawson, "a state-law tort action against an em-
ployer may be pre-empted by § 301 if the duty to the employee ... is
created by a collective-bargaining agreement and without existence in-
dependent of the agreement."' 28  Plaintiffs are not permitted to avoid fed-
eral preemption by pleading their claim as a tort under state law when it
actually states a claim for breach of the labor contract.' 29 Thus, section 301
124. Id. at 379 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
125. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).
126. Avco, 390 U.S. at 560 (holding that claims alleging the breach of a collective bargaining
agreement are completely preempted under section 301).
127. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 211 (1985); see also United Steelworkers v.
Rawson, 495 U.S. 362, 369 (1990); International Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 852-
53, 862 (1987); McCormick v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531 (4th Cir. 1991). In McCormick,
the Fourth Circuit held that wrongful or negligent employer conduct could be determined only in light of
the powers granted the employer in the collective bargaining agreement and that, as a result, the em-
ployee's state tort law claim was preempted. Under Virginia tort law, the plaintiff had the burden of
proving that the employer's conduct was either wrongful or negligent. Id. at 535 (holding that the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress requires proof of outrageous and intolerable conduct; the tort
of conversion is the "wrongful exercise... of authority... over another's goods.") (quoting Buckeye
Nat'l Bank v. Huff & Cook, 75 S.E. 769, 772 (1912)). The court reasoned that the employer's duty
could be determined only by interpreting the terms of the contract:
The circumstances that must be considered in examining management's conduct are not
merely factual, but contractual .... Cleaning out a locker is not a matter of intrinsic moral
import but a question of legal authority-whether management had the lawful right to proceed
as it did. . . . State tort claims are preempted where reference to a collective bargaining
agreement is necessary to determine whether a "duty of care" exists or to define "the nature
and scope of that duty ...." Whether the actions of management personnel ... were in any
way wrongful simply cannot be determined without examining the collective bargaining
agreement ....
McCormick, 934 F.2d at 536. In a lengthy dissent, Judge Phillips argued that the correct application of
the section 301 preemption doctrine would focus on the location of the tort duty and ignore any de-
fenses. Id. at 545 (Phillips, J., dissenting); see Stone, supra note 22, at 621-22 (noting approach of Judge
Phillips in McCormick as a narrower alternative, available within existing legal doctrines).
128. 495 U.S. at 369 (citing Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211).
129. Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211 ("Any other result would elevate form over substance and
allow parties to evade the requirements of section 301 by relabeling their contract claims as claims for
tortious breach of contract.").
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only preempts claims for violation of a labor contract, either formally or
substantively pleaded. In determining whether a claim is one for violation
of a labor contract, the preemption inquiry focuses on whether the duty
allegedly violated derives from the collective bargaining agreement or an
independent source such as state tort law, regardless of whether the test is
phrased as "independent," "inextricably intertwined," or "substantially de-
pendent."' 3 ° Claims involving a duty created by the contract consistently
have been found preempted. 31 In contrast, claims alleging the violation of
a duty created by a source "independent" of the labor contract have not
been preempted.' 32 A defendant's assertions, whether for removal purposes
or as a defense on the merits, that the terms of an agreement provide a
defense to a state law claim are irrelevant to the issue of section 301 pre-
emption because they do not relate to the source of the duty inquiry. 33
Yet both Judge Phillips's dissent in McCormick v. AT&T and the Mar-
cus model note that Lingle may raise questions regarding this last proposi-
tion. 134  In discussing the tort claim, the Lingle Court stated that the
elements of the claim would not "require[ ] a court to interpret any term of
a collective-bargaining agreement," and the "purely factual inquiry" caused
by a "nonretaliatory reason for the discharge ... likewise does not turn on
130. Id. at 213, 220.
131. See Rawson, 495 U.S. at 368; Hechler, 481 U.S. 851; Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 220.
132. Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 407 (1988); Caterpillar Inc. v. Wil-
liams, 482 U.S. 386, 394 (1987).
133. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 543 (Phillips, J., dissenting) (citing Williams, 482 U.S. at 398-99).
134. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 543-44 (Phillips, J., dissenting); Marcus, Note, supra note 2, at 226-
27. Both Judge Phillips and Ms. Marcus interpret this language as dictum. McCormick, 934 F.2d at 544
(Phillips, J., dissenting); Marcus, Note, supra note 2, at 210 n. 11. Ms. Marcus's proposed test would
eliminate this section of the footnote to prevent further confusion over the preemptive scope of section
301. Id. at 22. Some courts have interpreted Lingle as suggesting that section 301 preempts a state law
claim when the employer raises a defense based on the collective bargaining agreement, although this
issue was not directly addressed in the case. See Hanks v. General Motors Corp., 859 F.2d 67, 70 (8th
Cir. 1988):
Lingle makes ... plain that the defenses as well as the claims, must be considered in determin-
ing whether resolution of the state law claims requires construing the collective bargaining
agreement. The factual background of the entire case must be examined against an analysis of
the state tort claim and a determination made whether the provisions of the collective bargain-
ing agreement come into play.
If an employer's assertion of a contractual defense by an employer does result in preemption, then more
state law claims brought by union workers are likely to be preempted after Lingle. Committee on Labor
Arbitration and the Law of Collective Bargaining Agreements, Labor Arbitration and the Law of Collec-
tive Bargaining, 7 LAB. LAW. 747, 755-61 (1991) (noting that the trend following Lingle was toward
more section 301 preemption). However, other commentators have argued that Lingle limited the pre-
emptive scope of section 301 and enabled union workers to assert claims of violations of their state law
rights. Robert P. Lane, Jr., Note, Labor Law Preemption Under Section 301: New Rules for an Old
Game, 40 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1279, 1291-93 (1989) (Lingle test limited the preemptive scope of Allis-
Chalmers); John E. Gardner, Note, Federal Labor Law Preemption of State Wrongful Discharge
Claims, 58 U. Cms. L. REv. 491, 526-27 (1989) (Lingle opened door to union employees' claims for
violations of state law rights).
SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
the meaning of any provision of a collective-bargaining agreement." 1 35 In
an accompanying footnote, the Court stated:
While it may by true that most state laws that are not pre-empted by § 301
will grant nonnegotiable rights that are shared by all state workers, we note
that neither condition ensures nonpre-emption. It is conceivable that a State
could create a remedy that, although nonnegotiable, nonetheless turned on
the interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement for its application.
Such a remedy would be pre-empted by § 301.136
While this section could be interpreted as requiring the preemption of a
claim when an employer's defense implicates the labor contract, the Wil-
liams decision clearly rejects such an interpretation. In fact, Lingle ex-
pressly endorses the reasoning of Williams, which held a claim was not
preempted because a federal waiver defense did not transform it into one
arising under federal law.1 37 Moreover, none of the Supreme Court deci-
sions can be construed as endorsing the preemption of a claim when the
employer's defense requires the interpretation of a collective bargaining
agreement.
Under this approach, the state court would not be deprived of jurisdic-
tion when the employer's defense requires interpretation of the contract.
Instead, a state court could assess the validity of the employer's defense
under its concurrent jurisdiction by applying federal law.' 3 8 This applica-
tion of the section 301 preemption doctrine would fulfill the twin goals of
permitting union employees to avail themselves of the safeguards created
by state law, while at the same time preventing employees from asserting
claims for breach of a labor contract, explicitly or otherwise.
IV
SECTION 301 AND THE ROLE OF ARBITRATION
Because courts endorse a strong presumption in favor of grievance and
arbitration procedures, 39 the Washington Supreme Court's application of
the section 301 preemption doctrine creates a potential conflict by provid-
ing union employees greater access to the judicial system to resolve their
disputes. 40 As the Court noted in Allis-Chalmers,' preserving the effec-
135. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 407.
136. Id. at 407 n.7. The Court provided no example of such a remedy.
137. Id. at 410 n.10; Williams, 482 U.S. at 398-99.
138. See Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 506 (1962); see also Lingle, 486 U.S.
at 413 n.12:
Thus, as a general proposition, a state law claim may depend for its resolution upon both the
interpretation of a collective-bargaining agreement and a separate state-law analysis that does
not turn on the agreement. In such a case, federal law would govern the interpretation of the
agreement, but the separate state-law analysis would not be thereby pre-empted.
139. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582-83 (1960).
140. Although this may explain why courts rarely preempt claims that are not cognizable under
such procedures, courts should instead focus on the relationship between the claim and the collective
1994]
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tiveness of the arbitration process is "central" to the section 301 doctrine.'1
2
However, arbitration is not an exclusive remedy, and the policies encourag-
ing the arbitration of disputes should not prohibit a union employee from
asserting claims based on state law rights which are available to non-union
workers.
Section 301 preemption of a union employee's claim has two signifi-
cant results. First, when a claim is preempted by section 301, the employee
must rely on the collective bargaining agreement's arbitration clause for
resolution of the grievance. 4 3 In Republic Steel, the Supreme Court held
that parties to a collective bargaining agreement must first exhaust griev-
ance-arbitration procedures provided for under the agreement before bring-
ing a section 301 action in federal court."' The Court further stated:
"Congress has expressly approved contract grievance procedures as a pre-
ferred method for settling disputes . ". .. , Second, preemption extin-
guishes the state right because the arbitrator interprets and applies the terms
of the collective bargaining agreement rather than the state law.' 46  The
preemption of a claim thus deprives the union member of the employment
rights created by the state.
Traditionally, union members have favored and relied upon the arbitra-
tion process established by collective bargaining agreements and the federal
courts for redress of their employment grievances. 47 But one problem with
this tradition is the limited review available from the courts. More than
thirty years ago, the Supreme Court adopted a very narrow standard for
judicial review of arbitration decisions. ' 48 Because of this narrow standard,
bargaining agreement, rather than addressing whether the claim can be remedied by a different forum.
Stone, supra note 22, at 610-11.
141. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985).
142. Id. at 219.
143. Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 652 (1965).
144. Id. at 652-53.
145. Id. at 653; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 173(d) ("Final adjustment by a method agreed upon by the
parties is declared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the
application or interpretation of an existing collective bargaining agreement.").
146. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 581-82 (1960); see
also Harry T. Edwards, Labor Arbitration at the Crossroads: The 'Common Law of the Shop' v. Exter-
nal Law, 32 ARB. 1. 65, 90-91 (1977); Bernard D. Meltzer, Ruminations About Ideology, Law, and
Labor Arbitration, 34 U. CHI. L. REV. 545, 557 (1967); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Judicial Review of
Labor Arbitration Awards: A Second Look at Enterprise Wheel and Its Progeny, 75 MtcH. L. REV.
1137, 1140-43 (1977); Stone, supra note 22, at 595. A minority view argues that the arbitrator should
consider law outside the agreement. See, e.g., Dennis 0. Lynch, Deferral, Waiver, and Arbitration
Under the NLRA: From Status to Contract and Back Again, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV. 237, 270-71 (1989).
147. Angel Gomez III, Preemption and Preclusion of Employee Common Law Rights by Federal
and State Statutes, 11I NDus. REL. L.J. 45, 46-47 (1989); White, supra note 36, at 390-92.
148. United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987) ("[Clourts are not
authorized to reconsider the merits of an award even though the parties may allege that the award rests
on errors of fact or on misinterpretation of the contract."); see also United Steelworkers v. Enterprise
Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 597 (1960) (stating that an arbitration award will be upheld "so long
as it draws its essence from the collective bargaining agreement"); United Steelworkers v. American
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judicial review of an arbitrator's decision is virtually nonexistent. 49 How-
ever, the promotion of arbitration in the Steelworkers Trilogy did not sup-
port the idea of an exclusive arbitration remedy for union employees.
While the Trilogy did establish presumptions regarding the parties' in-
tent,' 5 0 the parties need not include an arbitration clause providing for an
exclusive remedy. Instead, arbitration was envisioned as a response to the
disruptions caused by strikes, rather than a means of avoiding judicial appli-
cation of state law employment rights.'"' Although some courts have ar-
gued in favor of section 301 preemption that Congress "envisioned"
arbitration to be an "exclusive" process,'52 this argument is not persuasive.
While Congress and the Supreme Court have endorsed policies encouraging
arbitration, the Supreme Court's section 301 analysis has focused on the
development of a uniform body of law to interpret collective bargaining
agreements. However, the arbitration process does not support the goal of
developing a uniform body of federal law because arbitrators vary in their
contract interpretations and only loosely follow precedent.' 53 This argu-
ment also fails in the face of Congress' decision not to deny union employ-
ees the protections provided by federal employment rights laws. t54  In
addition, the language and legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act'55
does not support the contention that arbitration is always an exclusive rem-
Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564, 569 (1960) (holding that it was not the function of the courts to consider "the
meaning, interpretation, [or] application" of a collective bargaining agreement when the contract called
for resolution by an arbitrator).
149. Peter Feuille & Michael LeRoy, Grievance Arbitration Appeals in the Federal Courts: Facts
and Figures, 45 ARB. J. 35, 40-45 (1990).
150. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. at 582-83 (holding that collective bargaining agree-
ments containing grievance procedures carry a presumption of arbitrability).
151. Harper, supra note 40, at 703.
152. See Lingle, 823 F.2d at 1046-47. The Seventh Circuit declared that preemption was required
in order to protect the arbitration process from evisceration by the courts and to avoid a decline in the
use of arbitration.
153. See Reginald Alleyne, Delawyering Labor Arbitration, 50 OHIo ST. L.J. 93, 102-03 (1989).
154. Harper, supra note 43, at 702-03; see Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974)
(holding employee's statutory right to trial under Title V11 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is not fore-
closed by prior submission of the claim to arbitration under the collective bargaining agreement's non-
discrimination clause); Barrentine v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys., 450 U.S. 728, 745 (1981) (finding
wage claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act not barred by prior submission of the claim to the
grievance procedures under the collective bargaining agreement); McDonald v. City of W. Branch, 466
U.S. 284, 292 (1984) (holding a section 1983 action not barred by a prior arbitration award under the
principles of res judicata or collateral estoppel); Atchinson, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Buell, 480 U.S.
557, 565 (1987) (finding fact that a claim otherwise compensable under the Federal Employer's Liabil-
ity Act (FELA), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 51-60 (West 1986 & Supp. 1993), was caused by conduct arguably
subject to arbitration under the Railway Labor Act (RLA), 45 U.S.C.A. §§ 151-163, 181-188 (West
1986 & Supp. 1993), does not deprive an employee of the right to bring an FELA action for damages.
The RLA does not provide an exclusive remedy for an injury caused by a condition that can be the
subject of a grievance under the RLA).
155. 29 U.S.C.A. § 173(d).
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edy. 56 Section 203(d) of the Taft-Hartley Act states that "[f]inal adjust-
ment by a method agreed upon by the parties is hereby declared to be the
desirable method for settlement of grievance disputes arising over the appli-
cation or interpretation of an existing collective-bargaining agreement."' 57
Congress clearly did not intend arbitration to be the exclusive remedy avail-
able for the settlement of all employment disputes.
In Lingle, the Supreme Court struggled to reconcile the tension be-
tween federal labor policies favoring arbitration and the analytical frame-
work for section 301 preemption. The Court first emphasized the
importance of the arbitration process, noting the requirement that "the inter-
pretation of collective-bargaining agreements remains firmly in the arbitral
realm; judges can determine questions of state law involving labor-manage-
ment relations only if such questions do not require construing collective-
bargaining agreements." 158  Yet the Court also noted in Lingle that the
availability of arbitration does not bar individual employees from bringing
claims under federal statutes. ' Although it emphasized the strong policies
encouraging arbitration, the Court also stated that "different considerations
apply where the employee's claim is based on rights arising out of a statute
designed to provide minimum substantive guarantees to individual work-
ers.' A state court would be permitted to interpret the agreement when
the duty allegedly violated does not derive from the agreement; in such a
case, the provision of the agreement would be involved only tangentially
with the resolution of the dispute and the claim would not be preempted by
section 301.161 The Williams decision also supports the proposition that a
state court can examine the agreement to determine the validity of the em-
ployer's waiver defense without dismissing the claim for failing to exhaust
the arbitration process. 162
156. James E. Pfander, Federal Jurisdiction Over Union Constitutions After Woodell, 37 VuLL. L.
REv. 443, 471-72 n.75 (1992); Gerard D. Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29
GEo. WASH. L. REv. 285, 299 (1960-61).
157. 29 U.S.C.A. § 173(d).
158. 486 U.S. 399, 411 (1988) (footnote omitted).
159. Id. at 159.
160. Id. at 412 (quoting Buell, 480 U.S. at 564-65); see Lane, Note, supra note 134, at 1292 (argu-
ing that Lingle is a departure from prior cases, which emphasized the policies favoring the collective
bargaining process and arbitration to ensure that state employment protections were available to union as
well as non-union workers); Harper, supra note 43, at 689 (arguing that the test articulated in Allis-
Chalmers and Lingle does not adequately explain why the need for uniform federal law governing the
interpretation of collective bargaining agreements or protection of the arbitration process requires pre-
emption of state employment actions).
161. Lingle, 486 U.S. at 413 n.12 (quoting Allis-Chalmers, 471 U.S. at 211 (" 'not every dispute...
tangentially involving a provision of a collective-bargaining agreement, is pre-empted by § 301
.. .. 1,,,)).
162. 482 U.S. at 398-99 ("It is true that when a defense to a state claim is based on the terms of a
collective-bargaining agreement, the state court will have to interpret that agreement to decide whether
the state claim survives."). But see White, supra note 36, at 409 n.140 (dismissing this language as
"dicta").
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By limiting the federal policy favoring the arbitration of labor disputes,
the Supreme Court has made it clear that arbitration is not an exclusive
remedy. In Alexander v. Gardner-Denver,'63 although the collective bar-
gaining agreement contained a specific prohibition against racial discrimi-
nation, the Court held that prior submission of the claim to final arbitration
did not foreclose the employee's right to bring a separate action under Title
VII. t 6" The Court stated that the Title VII rights were distinctly separate
from the contractual rights, even though both resulted from the same factual
occurrence.' 65 In addition, the Court declared that despite the favored state
of arbitration, the arbitrator had neither the authority nor the expertise to
hear the Title VII claim because "the competence of arbitrators pertains
primarily to the law of the shop, not the law of the land."' 66 However, the
Court noted that any "arbitral decision may be admitted as evidence and
accorded such weight as the court deems appropriate," and "[w]here an
arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII
rights, a court may properly accord it great weight."' 67 The Supreme Court
perceived no tension in protecting the arbitration process while enforcing
minimum employment safeguards for union employees.' 68 It concluded
that, while the duplicative remedies would increase costs for the employer,
the exchange of a no-strike pledge for arbitration would induce the parties
to agree to a grievance procedure, while the speed and low cost of arbitra-
tion would attract employees.' 69
Similarly, in a decision that did not involve section 301,170 the Court
determined that the policies favoring arbitration did not require the abroga-
tion of state employment rights. Instead, the Court held that a state could
mandate "minimal substantive requirements on contract terms negotiated
163. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
164. Id. at 59-60:
We think therefore, that the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes and the federal
policy against discriminatory employment practices can best be accommodated by permitting
an employee to pursue fully both his remedy under the grievance-arbitration clause of a collec-
tive bargaining agreement and his cause of action under Title VII.
Id. at 59.
165. Id. at 48-50.
166. Id. at 57.
167. Id. at 60 & n.21.
168. Id. at 53-54 ("Thus the arbitrator has authority to resolve only questions of contractual rights
and this authority remains regardless of whether certain contractual rights are similar to, or duplications
of, the substantial fights secured by Title VII."); see also Harper, supra note 43, at 687. Although
Gardner-Denver left open the issue when state law conflicts with federal law, the analysis also is ap-
plied to claims based on state law. See Lingle, 486 U.S. at 409-10 (Lingle's state law claim for retalia-
tory discharge was arbitrated under the just cause provision of her collective bargaining agreement, and
she received reinstatement and back pay; the parallelism between the claims did not cause the state
claim to be preempted); see also Herman, supra note 94, at 612 ("The Court ... reasoned that Congress
intended Title VII to 'supplement rather than supplant, existing laws and institutions relating to employ-
ment discrimination.'") (quoting Alexander, 415 U.S. at 52); Yonover, supra note 2, at 80-81.
169. Alexander, 415 U.S. at 54-55.
170. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Massachusetts, 471 U.S. 724 (1985).
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between parties to labor agreements." '' The Court further stated that it
could "see no reason to believe that ... Congress intended state minimum
labor standards to be treated differently from minimum federal stan-
dards."' 7 2 A different result would "penalize[ ] workers who have chosen
to join a union by preventing them from benefiting from state labor regula-
tions imposing minimal standards on nonunion employers."' 73
In addition, it considered that the ability of unions to encourage collec-
tive actions would not be impaired by permitting union employees to avail
themselves of state law remedies. Rather, denying union workers these
state employment rights under section 301 would discourage union organiz-
ing activities since non-union workers still would be protected by state
laws.' 74 Although use of the arbitration process may be reduced by state
law alternatives, union employees still would prefer arbitration in many in-
stances, due to the speed of obtaining a remedy, the possibility of reinstate-
ment, ease of proof and limited expense.'75
171. Id. at 754.
172. Id. at 755.
173. Id. at 756.
174. See Herman, supra note 94, at 647-50 & n.263; Harper, supra note 43, at 703-04. In fact,
during the period when state legislatures and courts created these individual employment rights, union
membership declined from about 25% of the nonagricultural workforce to less than 17%. See Stone,
supra note 22, at 643; Leo Troy, Will a More Interventionist NLRA Revive Organized Labor?, 13 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL'y 583, 607 (1990) ("During the 1980's .... private-sector unions experienced one of
their most severe drops in membership .... "). For a discussion of various reasons for the decline, see
generally Charles McDonald, U.S. Union Membership in Future Decades: A Trade Unionist's Perspec-
tive, 31 INDUS. REL. 13 (1992); Robert J. Flanagan, NLRA Litigation and Union Representation, 38
STAN. L. REV. 957, 981-83 (1986); Paul Weiler, Promises to Keep: Securing Workers' Rights to Self-
Organization Under the NLRA, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1769 (1983); Theodore J. St. Antoine, Federal Regu-
lation of the Workplace in the Next Half Century, 61 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 631, 645 (1985); see also Jane
Byeff Kom, Collective Right and Individual Remedies: Rebalancing the Balance After Lingle v. Norge
Division of Magic Chef, Inc., 41 HASTINGS L.J. 1149, 1151 (1990) (suggesting that judicial recognition
of wrongful termination actions by at-will employees has contributed to the demise of unionization).
175. See Herman, supra note 94, at 653-54; Yonover, supra note 2, at 92-93; Court Hearing of the
Presidential Advisory Committee on Mediation and Conciliation, Daily Lab. Rep. (BNA) No. 93, at A-
10 (May 14, 1986) ("The time between request for a panel and an award averages 200 days with AAA
and 260 days with FMCS," and arbitrator costs average $1200); CHARLES S. LA CUGNA, AN INTRODUC-
TION To LABOR ARBITRATION 68-70 (1988) (costs of arbitration generally are divided between the union
and the employer, with the employee paying nothing beyond union dues); JAMES DERTOUZOS ET AL.,
THE LEGAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF WRONGFUL TERMINATION 24 (1988) (litigating a wrong-
ful termination claim averages about three years, and costs average approximately $80,000 in attorney's
fees and expenses); see also Alexander v. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 36, 55 (1974):
Where the collective-bargaining agreement contains a nondiscrimination clause similar to Ti-
tle VII, and where arbitral procedures are fair and regular, arbitration may well produce a
settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee. An employer thus has an incentive to
make available the conciliatory and therapeutic processes of arbitration which may satisfy an
employee's perceived need to resort to the judicial forum, thus saving the employer the ex-
pense and aggravation associated with a lawsuit. For similar reasons, the employee also has a
strong incentive to arbitrate grievances, and arbitration may often eliminate those misunder-
standings or discriminatory practices that might otherwise precipitate resort to the judicial
forum.
SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
Some commentators have argued that lack of preemption will under-
mine the arbitration process, weaken the union's bargaining position and
expose employers to the expense of litigating claims in multiple forums.' 7 6
These arguments regarding the negative consequences of dual remedies
were rejected by the Supreme Court in Gardner-Denver in the context of
Title VII and arbitration. 77 Yet permitting union employees to pursue their
claims in court, as well as through the grievance procedure, does create the
problem of increased costs for employers who face the possibility of litiga-
tion in multiple forums. In order to limit their potential exposure to the
large damage awards available and often granted for violations of state
rights, employers should carefully draft grievance procedure provisions in
labor contracts. 178  Although this would not eliminate damage claims for
non-negotiable rights that raise a public policy concern, it would restrict
employees to the grievance procedure for other alleged violations or even
eliminate the state right completely.
In some instances, arbitration has failed adequately to protect bar-
gained-for employment rights.' 79 One problem with arbitration is the lack
of the full panoply of due process protections provided in a judicial fo-
176. Raymond L. Wheeler & Kingsley R. Browne, Federal Preemption of State Wrongful Dis-
charge Actions, 8 INDUS. REL. L.J. 1, 30-32 (1986) ("Continued erosion of the principle of exclusivity of
arbitration can only have the effect of consigning arbitration to the status of a second-rate and disfavored
method of dispute resolution."); Weeks, supra note 19, at 690 (arguing that "wholesale preemption" is
required); see also Brief of the Chamber of Commerce of the United States as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Respondent, Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988):
[Elmployers will be routinely required to litigate employee discharge claims in multiple fo-
rums. Such multiple forum litigation may well force employers to dispense with the forum
they can avoid-arbitration--even though arbitral procedures provide the quickest, easiest and
least expensive method of fairly adjudicating employee's discharge claims. This, in turn, ulti-
mately would operate to the detriment of the system of labor-management relations that has
served employers and employees well in the over fifty years since the National Labor Rela-
tions Act was passed.
Id. at 2-3.
177. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 54-55; see also Herman, supra note 94, at 614 n.80 (pointing out
that following Gardner-Denver, the number of agreements containing arbitration clauses has increased
from 94% to 97%).
178. For example, an employer could include the following provision in the collective bargaining
agreement:
Any matter governed by or a subject of this Agreement, explicitly or implicitly, constitutes a
grievance under this Agreement and is subject to the Arbitration terms of the Agreement.
Such matters are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Arbitrator and may not be the subject
of any claim or cause of action in any other forum. The Arbitrator's decision will be final and
binding on the parties and those they represent. This provision is designed to cover any dis-
pute that may arise as the result of the employment relationship and encompasses any and all
potential causes of action that may arise out of that relationship.
179. See Katherine Van Wezel Stone, The Post-War Paradigm in American Labor Law, 90 YALE
L.J. 1509, 1529-30 (1981); James B. Atleson, Management Prerogatives, Plant Closings, and the NLRA,
I I N.Y.U. REv. L. & SoC. CHANGE 83, 93-96 (1982-83) (explaining how the "mandatory/permissive"
line and the "factual/legal" distinction substantively affect the bargaining process and represent hidden
value choices).
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rum.1 0 Arbitration remedies, usually reinstatement and back pay, are also
not very effective in remedying some employment disputes. For example,
reinstatement is often not a viable solution where there is a claim of sexual
harassment.' 8 ' Also, from the plaintiff's perspective, arbitration awards are
not as generous. For example, the average back pay award by the NLRB
for an unfair labor practice was $2,000 in 1980.82 In contrast, between
1982 and 1986, California employees won over seventy percent of wrongful
dismissal cases tried before a jury, with an average award of $652,100. t83
While these figures explain why employers prefer the arbitration process
and the broad preemption doctrine developed in the lower federal courts,
state employment laws provide several distinct advantages for employees,
including the right to a jury trial, punitive and emotional distress damages,
and a longer statute of limitations.' 84
Despite the federal labor policy goal of promoting arbitration as a
means to remedy employment disputes, arbitration is not the exclusive rem-
edy available to union employees covered by a grievance procedure. State
employment laws provide the union employee with additional rights and
with access to an alternative forum. While arbitration is still an attractive
method for settling many employment disputes because of its low cost, the
speed of recovery, and possibility of reinstatement (an employer is espe-
cially attracted to the lower damage awards and limited costs of litigating
only in one forum), an employee should be permitted to bring a state law
claim if the allegedly violated duty is independent of the collective bargain-
ing agreement.
V
SECTION 301 IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS AND STATE
COURTS
Despite the Supreme Court's efforts to eliminate the confusion and
conflicting results in the area of section 301 preemption, the lower federal
courts and state courts have continued to vary their application of the sec-
tion 301 "complete preemption" doctrine. This has been particularly true of
180. McDonald v. West Branch, 466 U.S. 284, 291 (1984). For a discussion of arbitration proceed-
ings, see generally FRANK ELKOURI & EDNA ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS (4th ed. 1985); OWEN
FAIRWEATHER, PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE IN LABOR ARBITRATION (2d ed. 1983).
181. See Stone, supra note 22, at 629-30.
182. ARCHIBALD Cox ET AL., LABOR LAW, CASES AND MATERIALS 263 (11th ed. 1991) (average
back pay award in 1980).
183. See William B. Gould IV, Stemming the Wrongful Discharge Tide: A Case for Arbitration, 13
EMPLOYEE REL. L.J. 404, 405 (1987-88).
184. Thomas Yamachika, The Law of Federal "Complete Preemption": A New Brand of Federal-
State Conflict, 41 LAB. L.J. 337, 343 (1990). Section 301 suits must be brought within the six-month
statute of limitations, while "[t]he statute of limitations for tort actions is one to three years in most
states; and six years for contract claims." Yonover, supra note 2, at 78 n.142; see also Kom, supra note
174. at 1184-95 (advocating that arbitrators be permitted to award punitive damages or that damages be
limited in state court actions).
SECTION 301 PREEMPTION
some of the claims raised in Commodore: defamation, outrage or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, and tortious interference with a contractual
or business relationship.
A. The Lower Federal Courts
The clear trend in the lower federal courts is towards expansion of
section 301 preemption. 18 5 For example, the Sixth Circuit recently pre-
empted an employee's claim-although interpretation of the collective bar-
gaining agreement was not necessary-because the court would have been
required to "address relationships that ha[d] been created through the col-
lective bargaining process . ". ..'6 In another case, the Ninth Circuit pre-
empted a claim of unlawful drug testing because the drug testing was a
working condition, and working conditions generally were covered by the
contract.187 In dictum, the court also said that section 301 would preempt
claims regarding any working condition within the scope of collective bar-
gaining. 188 This approach would result in the preemption of virtually all
state employment rights claims by union workers. Because of this expan-
sive application of the section 301 preemption doctrine, the lower federal
courts effectively have denied union workers many of the safeguards cre-
ated by state employment laws. 89
Following Lingle, lower federal courts typically have employed two
methods of reasoning that favor preemption. 190 The first method finds pre-
emption when an employer raises a defense requiring contract interpreta-
tion.' 9 ' As previously noted, however, this approach was expressly rejected
in Williams.'92 The second method, advocated by Professor White but re-
jected by the Washington Supreme Court in Commodore, finds preemption
when the state right is negotiable.' 3 In such a case, the claim is preempted
because the court would need to interpret the collective bargaining agree-
185. See Committee on Labor Arbitration, supra note 134, at 755-61; Stone, supra note 22, at 605.
186. Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1991).
187. Schlacter-Jones v. General Tel., 936 F.2d 435, 440 (9th Cir. 1991).
188. Id. at 441.
189. Marcus, Note, supra note 2, at 229; Herman, supra note 94, at 640.
190. See Stone, supra note 22, at 695 & n.22.
191. Stone, supra note 22, at 605. See, e.g., Jones v. General Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 383 (6th
Cir. 1991); Laws v. Calmat, 852 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that implied contractual terms pre-
empted claims for violation of state law protecting employees from drug testing); Jackson v. Liquid
Carbonic Corp., 863 F.2d 111, 113 (1st Cir. 1988) (finding that union agreement giving employers the
right to make "reasonable rules and regulations from time to time" preempted an employee's state law
right to be free from drug testing), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1107 (1989).
192. 482 U.S. at 398-99; see also supra notes 106-07 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 37-43 and accompanying text; see also Tellez v. Pacific Gas & Elec., 817
F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1987) (holding claims not preempted because the state right protecting employ-
ees from defamation was non-negotiable), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 908 (1987); Local No. 57, United
Ass'n of Journeymen & Apprentices of Plumbing v. Bechtel Power Corp., 834 F.2d 884, 888-90 (10th
Cir. 1987) (finding anti-blacklisting provisions of Utah Constitution not waivable, so claims not pre-
empted), cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1055 (1988).
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ment to see if the right actually was waived, and courts prefer to leave
contract interpretation to arbitrators.' 94 Waivable state employment rights
thus are automatically preempted under this approach.195
Union employees' claims that generally never are preempted are lim-
ited to those that directly parallel Supreme Court decisions. For example,
claims of discrimination on the basis of race, sex, age or another protected
classification are not preempted under the reasoning in Alexander v. Gard-
ner-Denver.'96 The Court in Lingle also endorsed an exception to section
301 preemption for claims under state anti-discrimination laws.' 97 In a sim-
ilar fashion, claims of retaliatory discharge for filing a worker's compensa-
tion claim are not preempted following the Lingle decision.' 98
However, certain claims almost always are preempted in the lower fed-
eral courts. This is particularly true with wrongful discharge claims.' 99 In
addition to general claims of wrongful discharge, defamation claims also
are routinely preempted. 2°  Courts preempt defamation claims because the
analysis requires determining whether the statements were privileged under
the terms of the contract. However, a state court could determine the valid-
ity of this defense under its concurrent jurisdiction,2 ' which is the approach
adopted by the Washington Supreme Court.
Claims for outrage, also termed intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress ("IIED"), and tortious interference with a business or contractual rela-
tionship are not so easily categorized. Circuit courts have reached varying
194. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 582 (1960) (stating that arbitra-
tors, not courts, should interpret collective bargaining agreements).
195. See White, supra note 36, at 379.
196. 415 U.S. 36 (1974); see also Ackerman v. Western Elec. Co., 860 F.2d 1514, 1517-18 (9th
Cir. 1988) (disability discrimination); Cook v. Lindsay Olive Growers, 911 F.2d 233, 238 (9th Cir.
1990) (religious discrimination); Austin v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 644 F. Supp. 763, 767 (D.
Mass. 1986) (disability discrimination); Scott v. New United Motor Mfg., Inc., 632 F. Supp. 891, 894-95
(N.D. Cal. 1986) (race discrimination); Peoples v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 638 F. Supp. 402,
408 (M.D. Pa. 1985) (race discrimination).
197. 486 U.S. at 412-13; see also Carrington v. RCA Global Communications, Inc., 762 F. Supp.
632, 641 (D.N.J. 1991) ("Following Lingle, courts have uniformly held that state anti-discrimination
laws are not preempted by § 301 of the LMRA . . . even where the labor contract itself prohibits
discrimination.").
198. See, e.g., Eldridge v. Felec Servs., Inc., 920 F.2d 1434, 1438-39 (9th Cir. 1990); Krashna v.
Oliver Realty, Inc., 895 F.2d 111, 115 (3d Cir. 1990); Smolarek v. Chrysler Corp., 858 F.2d 1165, 1168-
69 (6th Cir. 1988), vacated en banc, 866 F.2d 838 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 992 (1989).
199. See Daniel N. Kosanovich, Inching Through the Maze: Recent Developments in Preemption
Under the NLRA and the Impact of Caterpillar, Hechler, and Others, 4 LAB. LAW. 225, 253-54 (1988)
(noting that courts routinely preempt wrongful discharge or breach of contract claims).
200. See, e.g., Strachan v. Union Oil Co., 768 F.2d 703, 706 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that in the
absence of malice, state law defamation claims are preempted); Mitchell v. Pepsi-Cola Bottlers Inc., 772
F.2d 342, 348 & n.2 (7th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1047 (1986). But see Tellez v. Pacific Gas &
Elec., 817 F.2d 536, 538 (9th Cir. 1987) (defamation claims not preempted, because the agreement did
not govern defamatory statements).
201. Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502, 505-06 (1962).
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results in cases involving outrage or lIED claims.2"2 Some courts focus on
the degree of outrageousness when resolving an IIED claim.20 3 But a re-
cent Seventh Circuit decision finding an IIED claim preempted instead ex-
amined whether the alleged conduct was authorized by an express or
implied term in the agreement.2" Such an approach would preempt virtu-
ally all IIED claims when an employer raises a defense that the conduct was
permissible under the express or implied terms of the contract.20 5 In con-
trast, the approach in Commodore would not preempt the claim. Instead,
the employer's valid defenses could be examined in the state forum. Thus,
the preemption doctrine would not be expanded to deny employees protec-
tion from outrageous conduct.
Similarly, claims for tortious interference with a business or contrac-
tual relationship are difficult to categorize. Some courts have held that such
claims are preempted only if breach of a contract is an essential element of
the state law claim.2° 6 However, other courts have found such claims pre-
empted because they require interpretation of contract terms.2 07 The analy-
sis of such claims should depend on whether the state law requires the
existence of an enforceable contract or the breach of one. In cases such as
202. See McCormick v. AT&T Technologies, Inc., 934 F.2d 531, 546 n.4 (4th Cir. 1991) (Phillips,
J., dissenting) (noting conflicting results in IIED cases); Johnson v. Beatrice Foods, 921 F.2d 1015, 1021
(10th Cir. 1990) (courts of appeals have reached "varying results"). For examples of courts finding
IIED claims preempted, see McCormick, 934 F.2d at 537; Beatrice Foods, 921 F.2d at 1021-22; Douglas
v. American Info. Technologies Corp., 877 F.2d 565, 571-73 (7th Cir. 1989); Willis v. Reynolds Metals
Co., 840 F.2d 254, 255 (4th Cir. 1988); Truex v. Garrett Freightlines, Inc., 784 F.2d 1347, 1350-51 (9th
Cir. 1985); Newberry v. Pacific Racing Ass'n, 854 F.2d 1142, 1149-50 (9th Cir. 1988). For examples of
IED claims not preempted, see Tellez, 817 F.2d at 539; Zaks v. American Broadcasting Cos., Inc., 626
F. Supp. 695, 698 (C.D. Cal. 1985); Perugini v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 935 F.2d 1083, 1089 (9th Cir.
1991); Sauls v. Union Oil Co. of Cal., 750 F. Supp. 783, 786-87 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
203. See, e.g., Truex, 784 F.2d at 1352; see also Stone, supra note 22, at 613-14 (criticizing courts
which address the degree of the outrageous conduct).
204. Douglas, 877 F.2d at 573:
Because [the cause of action] consists of allegedly wrongful acts directly related to the terms
and conditions of her employment, resolution of her claim will be substantially dependent on
an analysis of the terms of the collective bargaining agreement under which she is employed.
A court will be required to determine whether her employer's conduct was authorized by the
explicit or implicit terms of the agreement.
205. Stone, supra note 22, at 615.
206. See Dougherty v. Parsec, Inc., 872 F.2d 766, 770-71 (6th Cir. 1989) (holding claim for tortious
interference not preempted where one of the employer's clients requested plaintiffs discharge in retalia-
tion for filing an OSHA complaint); Fox v. Parker Hannifin Corp., 914 F.2d 795, 800 (6th Cir. 1990)
(following Dougherty).
207. See, e.g., Milne Employees Ass'n v. Sun Carriers, Inc., 960 F.2d 1401, 1411-12 (9th Cir.
1992) (holding claims based on plant shutdown, after alleged promises to keep plants open and request-
ing that employees not seek other employment, preempted by section 301; also stating that the Ninth
Circuit generally finds such claims preempted), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2927 (1993); Magerer v. John
Sexton & Co., 912 F.2d 525, 530-31 (1st Cir. 1990) (holding that retaliation discharge claims under a
state statute require interpretation of the CBA and will be preempted); Johnson v. Anheuser Busch, Inc.,
876 F.2d 620, 624 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding claim preempted where employee accused of slashing tires
of other employees was terminated for violating plant rules because claim required an examination of
whether company could rightfully discharge under terms of the CBA).
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Commodore, where a contract is not required as an element of the state law,
the claim would not be preempted because the terms of a contract would not
be implicated.
B. The State Courts
State courts also have reached varying results in analyzing state law
claims and section 301 preemption.2" 8 While it is difficult to categorize
claims at the state level and virtually impossible to discern consistent meth-
ods of reasoning, state courts that have analyzed claims identical to the ones
raised in Commodore often have reached similar results.
Like the lower federal courts, state courts rarely preempt claims that
parallel Supreme Court decisions, such as claims of discrimination on the
basis of race, sex, handicap or another protected class.20 9 The courts reason
that discrimination claims have their origin in the public policy concerns of
state law and not in the collective bargaining agreement.21 ° However, the
Michigan Court of Appeals has found claims for discrimination based on
disabilities to be preempted in two cases.21' In both, the court found that
the discrimination claim depended on an analysis of the labor contract to
determine the employer's contractual duty-either to employees on indefi-
nite lay-off or regarding an employee's entitlement to a position based on
seniority.21 2 Yet this rationale directly contradicts the Supreme Court's de-
cisions in Gardner-Denver and Lingle, which found that the employer's
duty arose from federal or state law.21 3 Following the Lingle decision, state
courts also have uniformly refused to preempt claims of retaliatory dis-
charge for filing a workers compensation claim.21 4
208. See Yonover, supra note 2, at 88-89.
209. For examples of discrimination claims not preempted, see Kraft, Inc. Dairy Group v. City of
Peoria, 531 N.E.2d 1106 (I11. App. Ct. 1988) (race); Lewis v. Aalfs Mfg., Inc., 489 N.W.2d 47 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1992) (disability); Lowe v. Ford Motor Co., 465 N.W.2d 59 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (disability),
appeal denied, 479 N.W.2d 641 (Mich. 1992); Hall v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 457 N.W.2d 143 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1990) (race); Adkerson v. MK-Ferguson Co., 477 N.W.2d 465 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991) (disability),
appeal denied; 494 N.W.2d 745 (Mich. 1992); Betty v. Brooks & Perkins, 497 N.W.2d 512 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1993) (race and gender); Coulter v. Construction & Gen. Laborers Union Local 320, 812 P.2d 850
(Or. Ct. App. 1991) (sex); Hatridge v. Day & Zimmermann, Inc., 789 S.W.2d 654 (Tex. Ct. App. 1990)
(gender).
210. See Kraft, 531 N.E.2d at 1110.
211. DesJardins v. Budd Co., 438 N.W.2d 622 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988); Cuffe v. General Motors
Corp., 446 N.W.2d 903 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989).
212. DesJardins, 438 N.W.2d at 624; Cuffe, 446 N.W.2d at 903-04.
213. See supra notes 111-17, 164-68 and accompanying text.
214. See, e.g., Lathrop v. Entenmann's, Inc., 770 P.2d 1367 (Colo. Ct. App.), cert. granted, 778
P.2d 1370 (Colo. 1989); Ryherd v. General Cable Co., 530 N.E.2d 431, 434 (Ill. 1988) ("[I]f the
employee could not bring the claim 'but for' the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is pre-
empted. Conversely, section 301 does not preempt 'state rules that proscribe conduct, or establish rights
and obligations, independent of a labor contract."') (quoting Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S.
202, 212 (1985)); Conaway v. Webster City Prods. Co., 431 N.W.2d 795 (Iowa 1988); Bednarek v.
United Food & Commercial Workers, Local 227, 780 S.W.2d 630 (Ky. Ct. App. 1989); Finch v. Hol-
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In contrast to the approach of the lower federal courts, claims for defa-
mation or slander have not been preempted by state courts.2 5 As in Com-
modore, other state courts reason that the "right to be free from malicious
defamation . ..does not arise out of the rights negotiated in [a] labor
contract, but out of State law. 21 6
Similar to the results in the lower federal courts, state courts have
reached varying conclusions regarding claims for intentional infliction of
emotional distress or outrage. Some courts have held such claims to be
preempted because a determination of whether the employer's conduct was
extreme or outrageous would require interpretation of the "just cause" pro-
vision of the labor contract.21 7 Other courts have not preempted IED
claims on the theory that the outrageousness of the employer's conduct is
determined by state law, which has a strong interest in regulating this
conduct.
21 8
Unlike the decision in Commodore, claims for tortious interference
with a business or contractual relationship routinely are preempted in other
state courts. 21 9 However, all of these claims alleged interference with a
contractual relationship and can be distinguished from Commodore, where
the plaintiff alleged tortious interference with a business relationship. In
Washington, this claim does not require the existence of an enforceable
contract or the breach of one.220 In addition, the complaint in Commodore
alleged that the defendants interfered with the relationship between the
plaintiff and WSH, who was not a party to the collective bargaining
221agreement.
laday-Tyler Printing, Inc., 586 A.2d 1275 (Md. 1991); McDaniel v. United Hardware Distrib. Co., 469
N.W.2d 84 (Minn. 1991).
215. See, e.g., Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1090-91 (Ala. 1988); Reynolds
Metals Co. v. Mays, 547 So. 2d 518, 523 (Ala. 1989); Thompson v. Public Serv. Co., 800 P.2d 1299,
1305 (Colo. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 452 (1991); Krasinski v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 530
N.E.2d 468, 472 (Il1. 1988); Batson v. Shiflett, 602 A.2d 1191, 1210 (Md. 1992); Hanley v. Safeway
Stores, Inc., 838 P.2d 408, 412 (Mont. 1992).
216. Krasinski, 530 N.E.2d at 472.
217. See, e.g., Moreau v. San Diego Transit Corp., 258 Cal. Rptr. 647 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Abreu
v. Svenhard's Swedish Bakery, 257 Cal, Rptr. 26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989); Retherford v. AT&T Communi-
cations, 844 P.2d 949 (Utah 1992) (preempting fIED claim against supervisor).
218. See Hanley, 838 P.2d at 412; Coulter v. Construction & Gen. Laborers' Union Local 320, 812
P.2d 850, 853 (Or. Ct. App. 1991).
219. See, e.g., Fleming v. United Parcel Serv., 604 A.2d 657, 667-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1992); Nash v. AT&T Nassau Metals, 381 S.E.2d 206 (S.C. 1989); Retherford, 844 P.2d at 969-70; Joy
v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., 816 P.2d 90 (Wash. Ct. App. 1991).
220. Commodore, 839 P.2d at 323.
221. Id. at 322-23.
19941
140 BERKELEY JOURNAL OF EMPLOYMENT & LABOR LAW
VI
CONCLUSION
Lower federal courts and state courts often have reached conflicting
results in analyzing the issue of section 301 "complete preemption" of a
union member's state law claim. While these courts tend to focus either on
the negotiability of the state law right or whether the employer's defenses
implicate the collective bargaining agreement, the model adopted by the
Washington Supreme Court identifies problems with these approaches. Ini-
tially, Congress restricted the issue to the preemption of claims "for viola-
tion of [labor] contracts. 222  The Supreme Court interpreted this
authorization to also include suits for violation of a labor contract in sub-
stance though not in form.22 3 In making this determination, the Court's
inquiry consistently has focused on the source of the tort duty. Claims that
allege the violation of a duty grounded in the labor contract are preempted,
but duties that derive from a source of state law independent from a labor
contract are not. The approach adopted by the Washington Supreme Court
provides parties to a collective bargaining agreement with a consistent
method of adjudicating state law claims. Most important, the approach is
faithful to the "complete preemption" doctrine developed by the Supreme
Court in its line of cases and to the language of section 301. Nevertheless,
the clear trend in the lower federal courts, as well as in some state courts, is
towards the expansion of section 301 preemption, thus denying union em-
ployees the safeguards created by state legislatures and courts. If this trend
continues, it may have a detrimental impact on the ability of unions to re-
cruit employees and to effectively bargain to protect their rights.
222. 29 U.S.C.A. § 185(a).
223. Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 210-11 (1985).
